Administration's Facade of Credibility Erodes

Official investigations are slowly prying out information on 9/11, but with considerable obstacles

by Rodger Herbst

The Bush administration has built its wartime credibility--once thought to be unassailable--on a defensive response to the attacks of 9/11. Now the administration is on the defense against a growing body of information regarding prior knowledge of the attacks.

In January 2002, both Bush and Cheney asked Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle that inquiries be limited to the congressional Intelligence Committees. In February, The House and Senate, controlled by opposing parties, responded by forming an unprecedented Joint Intelligence Committee. (2/12/2002 Washington Post)

On May 22, 2002, amid Joint Committee strife and continuous administration warnings of new terrorist attacks, Daschle called for an independent commission to investigate government action before the 9/11 attacks. He said such a panel was needed for "greater public scrutiny, involvement,and understanding.'' (5/22/02 New York Times)

Slow-Walked and Stonewalled

Although Joint Committee Leaders Senator Bob Graham and Representative Porter Goss had hoped to make rapid progress, scuffles regarding staffing caused a number of scheduling delays.

The committee's attention then turned to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which revealed a number of FBI irregularities, including headquarters' thwarting of the recommendations of Phoenix and Minneaopolis field agents prior to the September attacks. These embarrassments had earlier led to further leaks of related information. Among the revelations was an August 6 2001 President's Daily Briefing (PDB) by the CIA. The White House has since acknowledged in response to news reports that this briefing suggested Al Qaeda might be planning to hijack aircraft. The Joint Committee's inquiry was effectively shut down by Vice President Dick Cheney on June 20 when he denounced it as a source of a "National Security Agency leak": News networks reported the texts of two NSA intercepts received the day before 9/11, but not translated until the day after. Even though the White House itself had earlier released this information, the inquiry was obligated to submit to an investigation by the FBI to determine the source of the leak. The FBI counter-investigation was only the most visible of extensive administration attempts to control damage. The Administration refused to provide the Joint Committee access to the President's Daily Briefs, citing executive privilege (11/08/03 NYT), and also refused to allow testimony from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld or Secretary of State Colin Powell.

On September 5, 2002 Richard Shelby, the ranking Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee, expressed doubts that the committee's investigation into 9/11 would accomplish anything, and he, like Daschle, supported an independent investigation. "You know, we were told that there would be cooperation in this investigation, and I question that. I think that most of the information that our staff has been able to get that is real meaningful has had to be extracted piece by piece." He adds that there is explosive information that has not been publicly released. "I think there are some more bombs out there ... I know that." (9/10/02 NYT )

Republican Senator John McCain noted the Bush Administration "slow-walked and stonewalled" the inquiry, which issued its final report on December 10 2002. It was not permitted to tell the full story, to make the president accountable, or to propose legislation for reform. (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists March/April 2003 "Slow-Walked and Stonewalled" by John Prados)

The National 9/11 Commission: A National Scandal?

Mr. Bush successfully opposed creation of an independent National Commission for over a year. Then on September 20, 2002, in the wake of the damaging Joint Committee revelations, Mr. Bush reversed course. On November 27 2002, Title VI of Public Law 107-306 established a new Congressional National Commission, formally known as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. This commission is to examine and report upon the facts and causes of the attacks; to ascertain, evaluate, and report on the evidence developed by all relevant governmental agencies, and build upon the investigations of other entities. It is to complete this work by the end of May 2004. Mr. Bush insisted on the right to name its chairman, Henry Kissinger, who he said would "follow the facts no matter where they lead. " A New York Times editorial suggested the White House initially appointed Henry Kissinger as Commission Chairman "to contain an investigation it has long opposed."(11/29/02 NYT)

Facing questions about potential conflicts of interest, Kissinger resigned from the Commission on December 13 Publicly, the White House has pledged cooperation with the National Commission, but privately, cooperation has been less than obvious. From the commission's inception, commissioners and others say, the White House has put obstacles in its way. (Newsweek www.msnbc.com/m/pt/printthis.asp?storyID=910676)

The Commission was originally allotted $3 million. In March 2003 Commission Chairman Tom Kean requested an additional $11 million, based on an analysis of what commission members believed they needed to provide a staff of 60 for the 18-month study. The initial request was ignored and funding was delayed. (3/26/03 Time)

Weeks later, the administration provided $9 million in supplemental budget. This meager funding to investigate why 3000 people died has been compared with the $50 million provided to investigate the Columbia space shuttle tragedy in which seven people died, and the $50 million provided to investigate Whitewater and "Monicagate".

While the law establishing the commission required it to build on the classified Joint Intelligence Committee report, the White House initially blocked the commission's access to that report. A declassified version was finally released in July 2003, eight months into the 18-month allotted life of the Commission. On orders of the Bush administration, numerious selections were redacted, including a 28-page section dealing with suspected Saudi ties to the 9/11 plot, and NSA Director Michael Hayden's June 18, 2002 testimony.

Even with these omissions, the declassified report was damaging to the administration. For example, Commissioner Max Cleland, a triple amputee veteran of the Vietnam War and former Democratic Senator from Georgia, learned that "an FBI informant in San Diego... was living with two of the hijackers, and FBI headquarters didn't even tell him that they should have been... looked at because the CIA didn't tell the FBI." Cleland further observed: "the NSA didn't pass it on to the CIA or the FBI. They were picking up intelligence as early as 1994 about a potential attack in this country using aircraft. What we have here [in this report] is a devastating indictment of the intelligence community." (7/3/03 Bill Moyers Now, PBS: www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript_cleland.html)

At the White House's insistence, an adviser to Attorney General John Ashcroft has been reviewing all of the commission's requests for documents and interviews sent to federal agencies. Cleland, said the White House was "cherry picking" documents it wanted to withhold. "It's obvious that they're sifting the information to the 9/11 commission now," he says. "We're way, way late here. The picture is not encouraging." (7/7/2003 Wall Street Journal)

In July, the Commission acknowledged that its work was being hampered by failure of executive branch agencies, especially the Pentagon and the Justice Department, to respond quickly to requests for documents and testimony. Commission Chair Thomas Kean also suggested the administration's insistence on the use of "minders" during testimony amounted to intimidation of witnesses. (7/8/03 NYT)

Cleland became the first panel member to say publicly that the commission could not complete its work by its May 2004 deadline and the first to accuse the White House of withholding classified information from the panel for purely political reasons. "It's obvious that the White House wants to run out the clock here," he said in an interview in Washington. He also said Bush's re-election campaign had reason to fear what the commission was uncovering in its investigation. "As each day goes by, we learn that this government knew a whole lot more about these terrorists before September 11 than it has ever admitted." (10/26/03 NYT)

On November 12, 2003, the commission announced that after months of talks and the threat of subpoena it had reached agreement for the White House to provide limited access to the President's Daily Briefs. Administration officials acknowledged that they fear that information in the reports might be construed to suggest that the White House had clues before 9/11 that Al Qaeda was planning a catastrophic attack. Under the accord only two members of the 10-member commission would have access to the full library of daily briefings prepared in the Bush and Clinton administrations and two other members would be allowed to read just the copies of the briefings that the White House deemed relevant to the inquiry. (11/13/03 NYT)

Although the agreement appeared to have the support of most of the commissioners, it was denounced by two: Timothy J. Roemer and Max Cleland. Roemer said in an interview that the White House was continuing to place unacceptable limits on access to the Daily Presidential Briefings. "I am not happy with this agreement, and I will not support it." Cleland's response was much more scathing: "This is a scam, it's disgusting. America is being cheated." (11/13/03 CNN with Wolf Bliter) In an interview with Eric Boehlert of Salon.com, Cleland noted "The president's... decision compromised the mission of the 9/11 commission, pure and simple.... It is a national scandal." (11/21/03 salon.com) Immediately after his comments on CNN and Salon.com, Bush nominated Cleland to serve on the board of the Export-Import Bank. Because statutes governing the panel bar anyone who holds a federal job, he will have to leave the commission. (Washington Times)

The Commission subsequently announced on December 9 that Bob Kerry, former Nebraska Senator and current President of the New School University of Manhattan (NY) would replace Cleland.

On November 20, 2003, Commission Deputy Communications Director Al Felzenberg announced that the Commission had selected four representatives to "examine" the Presidential Daily Briefs: Chairman Kean, Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton, Commissioner Jamie Gorelick, and Staff Executive Director Philip Zelikow. Only notes are permitted, and only Kean, Hamilton, Gorelick, Zelikow may view their own notes--and only at the White House. Only Gorelick and Zelikow will have direct access. The other seven commission members will only be able to read a "summary" subject to White House review. The 9/11 Family Steering Committee responded in writing: "This Agreement is replete with varying levels of 'editing' by the White House. It shows a lack of cooperation by the White House in facilitating this Commission's investigation." The 9/11 Commission website (www.9/11commission.gov) reveals that Jamie Gorelick has close ties with both the CIA and the administration.

As Executive Director, Zelikow, with close professional and informal ties to the Administration, retains the power to hire all Commission staff and coordinate the flow of Kean's investigation. He also has access to all testimony--past and present, and manages all upcoming witnesses, document requests and subpoenas. (11/21/03 www.tomflocco.com)

Victim families complained of Zelikow's conflicts of interest in an October 3 letter to the Commission, but were rebuffed. (10/14/03 Washington Post)

In a striking new development, Chairman Kean disclosed on December 17 that the attacks could and should have been prevented, and is now pointing fingers inside the administration and laying blame. "There are people that, if I was doing the job, would certainly not be in the position they were in at that time because they failed. They simply failed." Kean also promised major revelations in public testimony beginning in January from top officials in the FBI, CIA, Defense Department, National Security Agency and possibly President Bush and former President Clinton. (www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/17/eveningnews/main589137.shtml)

The 911 Visibility Project (info@911visibilityproject.org) is a Seattle area citizens group working to obtain complete and truthful responses from our government regarding a multitude of inconsistencies in the official explanation of these events. The group is closely allied with a national efforts (info@septembereleventh.org), and will be sponsoring a number of educational and activist events in 2004.

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