UW Plagued by Biosafety Problems

from Labwatch Seattle

Less than a year after the University of Washington withdrew a request for federal funding for a high security biodefense lab, recently released transcripts reveal systemic safety problems at several UW biosafety labs.

At the January 2006 meeting of the UW Institutional Biosafety Committee, members discussed multiple safety lapses that included both procedural and equipment failures.

At least six and possibly more than a dozen scientists ("PIs" or "Principal Investigators") working at a biosafety lab in South Lake Union disregarded SOPs (standard operating procedures) on assigned work with biohazardous agents.

The PIs "initiated their studies without getting final approval and without having the appropriate biosafety cabinets, the appropriate rooms, the appropriate education, the appropriate paperwork on file and without the appropriate waste stream," according to David Emery, Chair of the UW IBC (Institutional Biosafety Committee). "For the life of me, I can't figure out exactly what happened here." (From a transcript of the January 13, 2006 meeting of the UW IBC). It appears neither of the two oversight groups, Environmental Health & Safety (EH&S), nor the IBC, upon discovering the violations, sought to halt the biohazardous work.

In addition, IBC meeting transcripts indicate that a backup air handling system--a primary laboratory safety component--failed during a 2005 test at one of the BSL-3 labs located in the UW's Health Sciences Building. The incident triggered an immediate shutdown of the affected labs, and all associated researchers received medical surveillance. Due to the failure, the UW plans to begin regularly testing its 30 other BSL-3 labs located on-campus, in the U-District and in South Lake Union.

Biosafety laboratory concerns are nothing new to Seattle.

* Lab safety was the primary concern raised at public hearings when the UW proposed building a high-security biodefense BSL-3 complex on-campus last year. Since then, the Northeast District Council (NEDC), an organization representing 20 neighborhoods has proposed public oversight of biosafety labs in Seattle.

* In 2004 three researchers at the IDRI/Corixa BSL-3 labs on First Hill in Seattle were exposed to TB from a faulty animal aerosol chamber.

* The UW plans to aerosolize the recreated 1918 influenza virus on monkeys at BSL-3 labs located in the densely populated neighborhood of Belltown next year. The 1918 influenza strain killed an estimated 40 to 100 million people. It currently has no known cure.

For more info see Labwatch Seattle www.labwatch.org.