| ||||
 |  | |||
| Home | Subscribe | Back Issues | The Organization | Volunteer | Do Something Directory | ||||
| ||||
 |
WHY UNITED'S MECHANICS VOTED "NO"
Bankruptcy used as union-busting tactic, and theIAM leadership seems unwilling to fight concessions
opinion by Barry Sheppard
The bankruptcy filing by United Airlines, the second largest airlinein the world, is the next step in the war it is waging against itsworkers. Threatening to go bankrupt was used as a club to get thepilots, flight attendants, ramp, and other support workers to vote formassive cuts in their own wages and benefits. However, United'smechanics voted down the concessions the leadership of theInternational Association of Machinists (IAM) urged them to accept.The vote of the mechanics was one of the very few bright spots in theAmerican labor movement in recent years.
The concessions were supposedly to help United stay out of bankruptcyby getting loan guarantees from the government. But United was oncourse for bankruptcy whether or not the loan guarantees were granted.The government board made it clear that even if the mechanics hadaccepted their concessions, more drastic rollbacks were needed.
United can utilize the bankruptcy proceedings to force bigger cuts inwages and benefits. The company can now ask the bankruptcy judge toarbitrarily abrogate the contracts it now has with the pilots, flightattendants and machinists. Any of his rulings can be appealed - to anequally pro-business review board. United executives are now alsodemanding major changes in work rules.
United workers, and not just the mechanics, are angry. Some backgroundis in order. In 1994 United wanted concessions from its workers,pleading poverty. The pilots union and the IAM bought into an EmployeeStock Ownership Plan (ESOP). The flight attendants didn't.
Under the ESOP, the pilots and machinists got stock in the company inreturn for a wage cut. Wages were frozen at the new rate until 2000,when the contract would again be opened for change. But this stock wasunusual. It couldn't be sold until the employee left the company. Soit was really a retirement plan, and was coupled with the company nolonger paying anything into the 401(K) plan.
The stock did go up, to a high of about $100 in 1997. Those employeeswho retired then got something back from their sacrifice. Now thestock is worth about $1.
Supposedly, the ESOP meant that the company was now "employee-owned"with 55 percent of the stock. But it was not "employee-controlled" ofcourse. On the Board of Directors the IAM had one person, the pilotsone, and one was reserved for salaried employees. The rest were thecreatures of the private investors, who continued to run the company.The IAM person was appointed by the top IAM officials. He never oncevoted in any other way than with management. The pilot's elected theirperson, and management appointed the representative of the salariedpeople.
A negative thing developed. Union solidarity began to erode, asworkers thought of themselves as "owners." The IAM newspaper began torun articles by management, and the IAM pushed the line that labor andcapital were one big happy family.
Management also promised that when the contract was up for changes in2000, there would be a "seamless" transition. Guess what - managementlied. When negotiations began prior to the end of the old contract, itturned out that the company was playing hardball. In the six yearssince 1994 United raked in billions. The workers wanted to at leastcatch up with what workers for other airlines were getting. But that'snot what management was proposing.
Once the pilots understood that they had been had, they voted outtheir old leadership and put in a new one. In the summer of 2000, theybegan to refuse overtime, their legal right. This job action disruptedUnited's flight schedules, and the company capitulated and gave thepilots the increase to bring them up to pilots in other airlines.
From the time the IAM contract was open for change in June 2000, theIAM conducted its negotiations in secret. We got fliers every once inawhile telling us things were going right along, but which containednothing concrete. Negotiations dragged. We were still under the termsof the old contract, at 1994 wages.
Another union, the Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association (AMFA) hadbeen seeking to replace the IAM as the bargaining unit for themechanics and related employees. After the debacle of the IAM-recommended ESOP, and the foot-dragging by the company, keeping us onthe terms of the ESOP contract, anger at the IAM grew. Support forAMFA grew too.
AMFA had a lot going for it in the eyes of most mechanics. It isdemocratic. Its officers and negotiators are elected and can easily bereplaced. Its negotiations are not secret but open to the membership.AMFA had won at Northwest Airlines, and was in negotiations. Rank andfile workers could sit in on the negotiations (if too many showed up,lots were drawn to see who would sit in on them). Reports were madeweekly (sometimes daily) to the membership on what was going on. Aninformed and participating membership is a mobilized membership, andthis power resulted in the Northwest mechanics getting the best dealin the industry.
In the summer of 2001, AMFA turned in cards from a majority ofmechanics at United calling for a vote for representation. These cardswere turned into a Presidential commission overseeing the negotiations(the airlines are under the Railway Labor Act, and so are not underthe NLRB).
The IAM officials, in collusion with management, then "found" hundredsof IAM "members" not previously accounted for. Among these weresecretaries who had never been members or paid dues to the union,people in management, people who had quit the company 25 years ago,and so forth. So the government commission ruled that AMFA missedhaving enough cards to call an election - by six cards. The electionwasn't held that AMFA would have won hands down.
Finally, in the early months of 2002, with the hot breath of AMFAbreathing down the necks of both the IAM and the company, a newcontract was proposed that would bring us up to the level ofAmerican's mechanics. But there was a poison pill in the contract. TheIAM had agreed to reopen the contract if United said it might gobankrupt. The membership voted for this contract by a small majority.Now the IAM wants to jettison this contract in favor of theconcessions that management wants. This time, the mechanics voted noon the concessions.
United workers face a tough fight. We have to face not only thecompany, but also now the bankruptcy court. And we have one hand tiedbehind our backs by the IAM. United has made drastic cuts in itsworkforce already, due to the economic downturn. It may threaten toclose shop entirely. Layoffs and company failures are part of thiscapitalist system. We shouldn't accept the argument that we workersare the cause of such catastrophes, because we aren't. It is alwaysbetter to fight than to agree to being hosed.
Barry Sheppard is a United Machinist. This article was originallypublished on a labor issues website edited by Bob Mattingly.
